

THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

KIMBERLY JOHNSON, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALBERTSONS LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-cv-001678-RAJ

**DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

**NOTED ON MOTION CALENDAR:
DECEMBER 20, 2019**

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CASE NO. 2:18-CV-001678-RAJ

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. MOTION	1
II. INTRODUCTION	1
III. SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS	2
Plaintiff's Background.....	2
Plaintiff is trained on Albertsons policies	2
2013: Intermountain West Division President Susan Morris concludes Plaintiff underperforms, Plaintiff loses Intermountain West Division position	2
2013: Employees complain about Plaintiff—Albertsons Seattle Division President coaches Plaintiff to improve leadership style and not “threaten staff,” “play favorites,” or “manage by intimidation”	3
2015: Albertsons merges with Safeway: District Manager expectations increase	4
Same Store Sales versus Sales Projections	4
2015-2016: Another supervisor concludes Plaintiff's performance is “unacceptable” and Albertsons receives employee complaint about Plaintiff	5
2016: Plaintiff's performance deemed “unacceptable” and Plaintiff concedes underperformance	6
2017: Plaintiff's “worst district” performance, and employee complaints about Plaintiff	7
October 2017: Performance Improvement Plan	8
December 2017: Albertsons shuts down Plaintiff's dirty delis and issues Plaintiff “Last Chance Warning”	9
January 2018: Following a complaint of discrimination by Plaintiff, Albertsons retains independent investigator who finds no discrimination and that PIP was justified	10
January-April 2018: Plaintiff fails to consistently improve pursuant to the PIP and her employment is terminated	11
Albertsons replaces open District Manager position with a woman; district performance improves under new management	12
Procedural posture	13

1	IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT	13
2	A. Summary Judgment Standard of Proof.....	13
3	B. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a <i>Prima Facie</i> Gender Discrimination Claim.	13
4	1. Plaintiff was not performing satisfactorily.	15
5	2. No evidence of more favorable treatment of similarly-situated	
6	male District Managers.....	17
7	3. No causal connection between Plaintiff's gender and her	
8	termination.....	18
9	4. Albertsons had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for	
10	Plaintiff's termination, which was not a pretext.....	19
11	C. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a <i>Prima Facie</i> Retaliation Claim.....	20
12	D. Albertsons Is Not Liable for Punitive Damages as a Matter of Law.....	23
13	V. CONCLUSION	24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

<i>Allison v. Hous. Auth. of City of Seattle,</i> 118 Wn.2d 79, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)	21
<i>Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,</i> 477 U.S. 242 (1986)	13
<i>Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc.,</i> 292 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2002)	14
<i>Bergene v. Salt River Project,</i> 272 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001)	20
<i>Blair v. City of Mercer Island,</i> 2018 WL 2317610 (W.D.Wash. 2018)	20
<i>Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,</i> 477 U.S. 317 (1986)	13
<i>Connor v. Micron Technology, Inc.,</i> 341 F. App'x 302 (9th Cir. 2009)	21
<i>Coszalter v. City of Salem,</i> 320 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2003)	22
<i>Cozzi v. Cty. of Marin,</i> 787 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2011)	21
<i>Day v. Sears Holdings Corp.,</i> 930 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2013)	18
<i>Domingo v. Boeing Employees' Credit Union,</i> 124 Wn. App. 71, 98 P.3d 1222 (2004), <i>abrogated on other grounds by</i> <i>Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas Cty.,</i> 189 Wn.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464 (2017)	23
<i>Garcia v. City of Everett,</i> 14-30 RAJ, 2015 WL 1759208 (2015), <i>aff'd</i> , 728 Fed. Appx. 624 (9th Cir. 2018)	24
<i>Govan v. Security National Financial Corp.,</i> 502 F. App'x 671 (9th Cir. 2012)	22

1	<i>Graves v. Dep't of Game,</i>	
2	76 Wn. App. 705, 887 P.2d 424 (1994).....	21
3	<i>Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc.,</i>	
4	615 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2010).....	17
5	<i>Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I,</i>	
6	144 Wn.2d 172, 23 P.3d 440 (2001) <i>abrogated on other grounds by</i>	
7	<i>Mikkelsen</i> , 189 Wn.2d at 529	23
8	<i>Hoang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,</i>	
9	724 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Or. 2010).....	21
10	<i>Kahn v. Salerno,</i>	
11	90 Wn. App. 110, 951 P.2d 321 (1998).....	18
12	<i>Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,</i>	
13	527 U.S. 526 (1999)	24
14	<i>Korslund v. Dyncorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc.,</i>	
15	121 Wn. App. 295, 88 P.3d 966 (2004).....	23
16	<i>Lassair v. Wilkie,</i>	
17	2019 WL 5212959 (W.D. Wash. 2019)	19
18	<i>Lindsey v. Clatskanie People's Utility District,</i>	
19	140 F. Supp.3d 1077, 1089 (D. Or. October 23, 2015)	19
20	<i>McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,</i>	
21	411 U.S. 792 (1973)	14
22	<i>Megivern v. Glacier Hills Inc.,</i>	
23	No. 1110026, 2012 WL 529977 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2012).....	18
24	<i>Mesnick v. General Electric Co.,</i>	
25	950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991)	24
26	<i>Mondero v. Salt River Project,</i>	
27	400 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005)	20
	<i>Moran v. Selig,</i>	
	447 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2006)	17
	<i>Nilsson v. City of Mesa,</i>	
	503 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007)	19
	<i>Pearson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.,</i>	
	723 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2013)	21

1	<i>Pottenger v. Potlatch,</i>	
2	329 F.3d 730 (9th Cir. 2003)	16, 20
3	<i>Rivera v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,</i>	
4	331 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003)	13
5	<i>Salas v. Indep. Elec. Contrs. Inc.,</i>	
6	No. 11-1748 RAJ, 2013 WL 1898249 (W.D. Wash. 2013)	17
7	<i>Scrivener v. Clark College,</i>	
8	181 Wn.2d 439, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)	14
9	<i>Sieden v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.,</i>	
10	846 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2017)	23
11	<i>Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.,</i>	
12	25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir.1994), <i>cert. denied</i> , 513 U.S. 1082 (1995)	18
13	<i>Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv.,</i>	
14	518 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008)	18
15	<i>Torlowei v. Target,</i>	
16	401 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2005)	24
17	<i>Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,</i>	
18	570 U.S. 338 (2013)	21
19	<i>Vasquez v. Cty. Of L.A.,</i>	
20	349 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2003)	17
21	<i>Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.,</i>	
22	281 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002)	20
23	<i>Walia v. Potter,</i>	
24	No. C09-1188JLR, 2013 WL 392647 (W.D. Wash. 2013)	17
25	<i>Weil v. Citizens Telecom Services Company, LLC,</i>	
26	922 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2019)	16
27	<i>Williams v. City of Bellevue,</i>	
	No. 2:16-CV-01034-RAJ, 2017 WL 4387590 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2017)	21
	Statutes	
	42 U.S.C. § 1981a.....	24
	RCW 49.60	15, 18, 21

RCW 49.60.180(2)	14
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Other Authorities

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56	1, 13
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)	13
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)	13
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)	13
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I. MOTION

Defendant Albertsons (“Albertsons” or the “Company”) moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s: (1) gender discrimination claim under state and federal law; and (2) retaliation claim under state and federal law. Dkt. #1-1 at ¶¶4.36, 5.2-5.3.

II. INTRODUCTION

Albertsons employed Plaintiff Kimberly Johnson (“Plaintiff”) as a District Manager from 2001 to 2005, and again from approximately 2007 until her employment at the Company came to an end in April 2018. As reflected in her performance evaluation and a written warning, Plaintiff struggled with her performance as early as 2013 and 2014. After Albertsons and Safeway Inc. merged in early-2015, Plaintiff’s performance continued to decline. Her district’s performance consistently ranked at or near the bottom on key performance indicators as compared to other districts. After verbal counseling failed to improve her performance, on October 24, 2017, Plaintiff was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). Among the deficiencies noted, was food safety. In December 2017, during her PIP, deli departments in Plaintiff’s district were found to have numerous food safety policy violations, forcing upper management to close the delis during the busy Christmas season. Just days after the deli closures, Plaintiff lodged a complaint in January 2018 claiming gender discrimination. An independent, outside investigator found no gender discrimination, and concluded Albertsons had a legitimate basis for placing Plaintiff on the PIP. In April, 2018, after Plaintiff’s performance under the PIP did not sufficiently improve, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Albertsons promoted a female to fill the District Management position left open by Plaintiff’s termination, and recently promoted a second female to fill a District Manager opening. Plaintiff now alleges gender discrimination and retaliation under federal and state law. Neither claim is actionable under the facts and law governing this case.

Summary judgment should be granted based on the undisputed facts because: **First**, Plaintiff cannot establish her *prima facie* case for each of her claims. **Second**, Plaintiff cannot establish causation. **Third**, Albertsons had a legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory

1 reason for Plaintiff's termination. **Fourth**, Plaintiff cannot establish pretext: Albertsons had a
2 good faith basis for concluding Plaintiff was not performing in a satisfactory manner.

3 **III. SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS**

4 **Plaintiff's Background.** Albertsons hired Plaintiff as an at-will employee in 1983 as a
5 bakery sales clerk. Declaration of D. Michael Reilly ("Reilly Decl."), Ex. A at 17:21-18:18;
6 61:15-16. Over the next several years, she held various positions at the company. *Id.* at 18:21-
7 26:22. From 2001 to 2010 she served in various roles including as District Manager. *Id.* at 29:4-
8 40:21. As District Manager, Plaintiff oversaw about 20 stores. Reilly Decl., Ex. B at 93:15-19.
9 After an unsuccessful PIP, which started in October 2017, Plaintiff's employment ended in April
10 2018. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 43:6-44:25.

11 **Plaintiff is trained on Albertsons policies.** Over the years, Plaintiff received and
12 acknowledged the Albertsons employee policies numerous times, including in 2017. Declaration
13 of Trevor Ennis ("Ennis Decl.") at ¶4 and Ex. A. The employee handbook, provided to all
14 employees, explains how each employee is an "at-will" employee and outlines Albertsons'
15 Courtesy, Dignity and Respect Policy and Open Door Complaint Process. The Albertsons
16 policies prohibit discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. *Id.* at ¶5 and Ex. B. Employees also
17 know Albertsons had an anonymous phone line to lodge complaints. *Id.* Employees, including
18 Plaintiff, also received periodic training on Albertsons' policies, including its Courtesy, Dignity,
19 and Respect, and Zero Tolerance policies. *Id.*

20 **2013: Intermountain West Division President Susan Morris concludes Plaintiff**
21 **underperforms, Plaintiff loses Intermountain West Division position.** From 2010 to 2013
22 Plaintiff worked as a District Manager in the Intermountain West Division, in Idaho, Utah, and
23 Wyoming. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 43:6-17. Susan Morris became the new President of this
24 Division in 2013. Declaration of Susan Morris ("Morris Decl.") at ¶5; Reilly Decl., Ex. C at
25 9:24-10:6. Morris was first hired by Albertsons at age 16, and over the next 34 years progressed
26 from courtesy clerk to Store Director, Division President, and other positions. Morris Decl. at ¶3.
27 Currently Morris is Albertsons' Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer. Reilly

1 Decl., Ex. C at 6:15-20, 7:12-23; Morris Decl. at ¶2. She supervises the Division President of the
2 Seattle Division, Karl Schroeder.

3 When she became division President in 2013, Morris selected that division's management
4 team. Reilly Decl, Ex. C at 10:17-11:9, 16:19-24. Morris assessed Plaintiff's performance and
5 determined that Plaintiff's performance fell "*in the bottom half of*" District Managers in her
6 division. Morris Decl. at ¶5. Morris noted how Plaintiff's stores: (1) were dirty; (2) had poor
7 customer service at the front end; and (3) had low stock levels. Morris Decl. at ¶5. In addition,
8 Morris observed that Plaintiff's store directors were frustrated with her. *Id.* Consequently, Morris
9 decided not to select Plaintiff for management in her Division, leaving Plaintiff without a job. *Id.*
10 at ¶6.

11 Plaintiff eventually found a position as District Manager of District 24, in what was then
12 the Northwest Division of Albertsons in the Seattle area. *Id.* When Plaintiff assumed management
13 of District 24, Albertsons also realigned the stores in the various districts, with District 24 losing
14 some stores and picking up others. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 114:8-115:12. Following the merger of
15 Albertsons and Safeway in 2015, District 24 became part of the Seattle Division. Plaintiff was
16 District Manager for District 24 until her employment ended in April 2018. *Id.* at 44:17-25.

17 **2013: Employees complain about Plaintiff—Albertsons Seattle Division President**
18 **coaches Plaintiff to improve leadership style and not “threaten staff,” “play favorites,” or**
19 **“manage by intimidation”.** Plaintiff had performance difficulties from the beginning of her
20 tenure in the Seattle area. In 2013, after staff complained that Plaintiff made improper threats,
21 played favorites, and that they were fearful of retaliation, Albertsons Northwest Division
22 President Dennis Bassler met with and coached Plaintiff to change her conduct. Reilly Decl., Ex.
23 A at 61:23 – 62:22, 67:20 – 68:2, and Ex. 2. Bassler told her she was not treating staff with
24 “*courtesy, dignity, and respect*”—even Plaintiff acknowledged her staff perceived her as being
25 “harsh or abrupt.” *Id.* Bassler issued a “Note to File” to Plaintiff on November 11, 2013, detailing
26 the concerns that existed at that time. *Id.* Plaintiff's 2013 performance review confirmed
27 Plaintiff's performance “needs improvement.” Ennis Decl., Ex. C.

1 **2015: Albertsons merges with Safeway: District Manager expectations increase.**

2 Albertsons and Safeway merged in January 2015. Reilly Decl., Ex. B at 29:15–30:24. With that
3 merger, management expectations, particularly for legacy Albertsons District Managers like
4 Plaintiff, changed significantly. Declaration of Robert Backus (“Backus Decl.”) at ¶5. Prior to
5 the merger, legacy Albertsons District Managers were assessed on the bottom line performance
6 of stores they supervised. Backus Decl. at ¶5. Post-merger expectations for District Managers
7 included several other Key Performance Indicators both at division and company level. *Id.*
8 District Managers were expected to visit stores regularly, coach and hold store teams accountable
9 to achieve financial, merchandising and people development goals, and to follow company
10 schematics and sales programs. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 55:5-59:6, Ex. 1.

11 As far back as 2015 Plaintiff knew that stores in her district needed to improve in areas
12 including: (a) lower same store sales; (b) out of stocks too high—meaning the shelves were
13 missing stock to sell, which hurt overall sales; (c) low customer satisfaction; (d) low profitability;
14 (e) high shrink— through customer or employee theft, or over-producing perishable merchandise
15 that goes unsold; and (f) inefficient use of labor. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 116:21–118:11.

16 **Same Store Sales versus Sales Projections.** In assessing store and district performance
17 Albertsons looks at how a specific store performs versus that specific store or district’s
18 performance the year before. Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 57:19–58:7. This is known as “ID store sales.”
19 *Id.* This is different from “quarterly sales projections.” *Id.* Quarterly sales projections are
20 projected sales for each store in each district in the division, taking into account factors like new
21 competition from competitor stores, new products being offered or withdrawn from stores,
22 adding or closing stores, and how well the district is managed, based on a review of performance
23 indicators and store tours. Backus Decl. at ¶¶9, 11. A district may improve performance
24 significantly if the District Manager effectively follows corporate merchandising plans, lowers
25 out of stock and shrink, and more efficiently schedules workers. *Id.* at ¶11.

26 To set quarterly sales projections, Seattle area division management, including division
27 President Karl Schroeder and Senior Vice President of Operations Rob Backus, receive initial

1 division-wide quarterly sales projections from Albertsons Corporate Headquarters. Backus Decl.
2 at ¶9. Quarterly sales projections are based on various inexact assumptions and imperfect
3 information, and reasonable minds can sometimes disagree on how much factors like
4 competition, products offered, adding or closing stores, and how well the district is managed can
5 affect quarterly sales projections set for a given store, district or division. *Id.* As many as 20
6 District Managers in the Seattle area (most of whom were men) complained that sales projections
7 assigned to their respective districts were unreasonable or “unattainable.” Reilly Decl., Ex. D at
8 28:8–29:20, 33:20–34:2. District Managers John Ortiz, Ralph Nesta, Jay Rothermel, and Plaintiff
9 complained that sales projections given to their respective districts were “unattainable.” *Id.* at
10 28:8–29:20.

11 Albertsons uses an interactive process with District Managers to reassess given sales
12 projection, and management made adjustments to various district financial goals, including
13 Plaintiff’s district. Backus Decl. at ¶11. Plaintiff was invited to suggest adjustments to individual
14 store projections in her district. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 122:13–14, 123:7–22. Plaintiff admits that
15 Backus conferred with her about projections at three of her stores because he was concerned
16 about projecting the right number. *Id.* at 122:15–123:2. Plaintiff concedes that she has no
17 evidence that gender played any role in the setting of sales projections for her district. *Id.* at
18 124:15–18. Moreover, it “*would make no sense*” for the division President or Vice Presidents to
19 set unreasonably high financial projections for a particular district because performance bonuses
20 depended on whether the division, not individual districts, met financial goals. Reilly Decl., Ex.
21 D. at 123:20–124:125:3; Ex. E at 71:22–72:7.

22 **2015-2016: Another supervisor concludes Plaintiff’s performance is “unacceptable”**
23 **and Albertsons receives employee complaint about Plaintiff.** In February 2016, Plaintiff’s
24 supervisor at the time, Joe Perry, documented concerns about Plaintiff’s performance and
25 inappropriate staff interactions, leadership, and “lack of objectivity.” Ennis Decl. at Ex. E.
26 Among several directives, Perry felt compelled to coach Plaintiff to treat everyone fairly, without
27 preference to prior relationships or “banner preference” (“banner preference” refers to whether a

1 particular employee was affiliated with Albertsons or Safeway prior to the companies' merger).
2 *Id.* Later that year, in August 2016, Human Resources received an anonymous employee
3 complaint stating that Plaintiff continued to play favorites, and made gay and ageist jokes. Ennis
4 Decl. at Ex. F. In July 2016, Perry delivered Plaintiff's performance review, rating as
5 "unacceptable" her District's performance on "customer experience," and "unacceptable" for
6 "customer focus"—the company's number one objective. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 134:13–137:18,
7 Ex. 3. Plaintiff's district ranked last of all districts for customer focus. *Id.* Even Plaintiff admitted
8 the "unacceptable" rating was appropriate. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 134:13–137:18, Ex. 3.

9 **2016: Plaintiff's performance deemed "unacceptable" and Plaintiff concedes**
10 **underperformance.** In 2016, Karl Schroeder became the Seattle Division President, with Rob
11 Backus Senior Vice President of Operations, and Kenny Smith the Area 1 Vice President. Reilly
12 Decl., Ex. B at 4:14-19, 35:6-13; Ex. F at 8:13–10:21; Ex. G at 32:6-15. As Area 1 Vice
13 President, Smith directly supervised District Managers, including Plaintiff. Reilly Decl., Ex. A
14 at 86:2-6. Plaintiff initially "thought [Smith] was fine" and that they "had good dialogue." *Id.* at
15 87:14-16. Smith tried to help Plaintiff do her job by giving her tools he himself had used to
16 improve metrics. *Id.* at 114:1-7. Plaintiff admits Smith never made any sexist comments to
17 Plaintiff. *Id.* at 105:17-20.

18 During 2016, Plaintiff's district performed worse than all other districts overall with
19 respect to store conditions and performance. Backus Decl. at ¶12. Although districts in the Seattle
20 Division had a wide range of results, Plaintiff's district performance notoriously ranked at or near
21 the bottom of the other districts, and Plaintiff knew it. *Id.* Third-party contractor sanitation scores
22 ranked Plaintiff's stores dirtier, with a (34% success rate in 2016). *Id.* Plaintiff's stores were
23 poorly stocked, as confirmed by Plaintiff's self-reported and division-audited "out of stock"
24 scores which often were at 500 out of stock items in each store, when the goal was 200. *Id.* at
25 ¶13. Plaintiff's stores were generally poorly merchandised, and not following division
26 merchandising plans. *Id.* Independent survey responses also confirmed Plaintiff's stores provided
27 lower levels of customer service than most districts in the division. *Id.* And most significantly:

1 Plaintiff's district was the worst performing district when compared to same store or ID sales: a
2 comparison of her district's performance to her district performance a year earlier. ID store sales
3 decreased (-3.87%), more than any other district in the division, with the lowest EBITDA
4 (Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization) percentage at 2.35%. *Id.* at ¶12.

5 Plaintiff knew her performance was really bad, too. She emailed Backus acknowledging
6 that 2016 was "*the worst year of [her] career.*" Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 177:23–179:4, Ex. 8.
7 Plaintiff knew her district was not "*meeting the metrics*" and her performance review
8 "*established*" that fact. *Id.* at 178:19-23. Plaintiff vowed not to let Schroeder or Backus down in
9 2017 and that she would "*never let that [poor of performance] happen... again.*" *Id.* at 178:24–
10 179:4. But Plaintiff's performance did not markedly improve in 2017.

11 **2017: Plaintiff's "worst district" performance, and employee complaints about**
12 **Plaintiff.** In 2017, the Seattle Division began ranking all eleven (11) districts quarterly, using
13 eighteen (18) key performance indicators. Backus Decl. at ¶16. Plaintiff's district scored last
14 overall. *Id.* Plaintiff knew her performance was a problem: she was failing in her earlier promise
15 to "*never let that [poor performance from 2016] happen...again.*" On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff
16 emailed Backus admitting the "graphs on the wall" reminded her of 2016—and that her district
17 was reputed to be "*the worst.*" *Id.* at 176:16-20 and Ex. 8. Plaintiff again promised she "*will fix*
18 *this.*" *Id.* But Plaintiff failed to fix it: when district-by-district statistics from each quarter were
19 totaled for 2017, Plaintiff's district again ranked dead last out of 11 districts. Backus Dec. at ¶21.

20 During 2017, Plaintiff's subordinates also complained to Human Resources Manager
21 Trevor Ennis about Plaintiff's lack of support and leadership, including Store Directors Staci
22 Marshall, Dennis Johnson, Terry Payseno, and Isaac English. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 75:23–77:10;
23 Ex. G at 88:19–90:1, 99:18–100:21; Ex. H at 48:2–49:11; Ex. I at 44:19–49:2. Staci Marshall,
24 for example, considered taking a demotion, rather than continuing to work as a Store Director
25 under Plaintiff. Marshall was surprised, and pleased, when Smith transferred Marshall out of
26 Plaintiff's District 24 and into a Store Director position in another district. Reilly Decl., Ex. G.
27 at 102:21–103:12; Ex. I at 79:8-10. Isaac English and Terry Payseno eventually resigned. Reilly

1 Decl., Ex. H at 152:16–153:10, 153:22–155:4. Human Resources Manager Ennis, and Smith, met
2 with Plaintiff in September 2017 to address Plaintiff’s staff concerns about lack of leadership and
3 management style. Reilly Decl., Ex. G. at 249:14–251:10; Ex. H at 47:13–48:24.

4 Division President Karl Schroeder toured stores in all 11 districts and found Plaintiff’s store
5 in her district were “*some of the worst-operated stores [he had] seen in 42 years*” and that
6 Plaintiff’s district was the “*worst district*” he had ever seen by far. Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 36:13–19;
7 43:21–44:12. He also noted that Plaintiff’s district ranked in the bottom three of every one of the
8 18 main metrics measured. *Id.* at 44:13–45:18. Stores in Plaintiff’s district “*seemed chaotic, out of*
9 *control,*” “*dirty, filthy*” and were not following corporate-directed sales programs: there was a lot
10 of regular priced merchandise displayed in sale price zones. *Id.* at 36:13–37:8, 38:15–39:6.
11 Plaintiff’s District 24 performance was “*horrific*” and “*just basics were neglected consistently*”:
12 the financial results, store conditions, out of stocks, and leadership all were concerns. *Id.* Plaintiff
13 admitted there were problems, but did not take responsibility for her results and blamed those
14 problems on subordinates. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 39:13–43:24. Schroeder also believed he had to
15 act now because the “turnover report” showed employees in Plaintiff’s district were voting with
16 their feet, leaving employment at twice the rate of other districts. Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 48:14–
17 49:22. He decided that a performance improvement plan was the best course of action.

18 **October 2017: Performance Improvement Plan.** Before meeting with Plaintiff
19 Schroeder first consulted with his supervisor, Chief Operating Officer Susan Morris, on the plan
20 to place Plaintiff on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). *Id.* at 117:3–15, 124:5–11; Reilly
21 Decl., Ex. C at 25:14–23. Morris recalled her own observations of Plaintiff’s sub-par performance
22 in another division. She agreed that a PIP was appropriate; Plaintiff’s performance issues should
23 have been addressed earlier. Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 126:14–127:18; Morris Decl. at ¶7.

24 Schroeder then held one-on-one meetings with each district manager, and scheduled his
25 meeting with Plaintiff on October 24, 2017. Plaintiff must have known she was in for a tough
26 assessment: she knew her district ranked dead last in 9 of 18 performance indicators, and in the
27 bottom three districts as to all 18 key performance indicators. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 187:3–15;

1 Ex. F at 44:14-18. Schroeder intended for his meeting with Plaintiff to be a nurturing process,
2 trying to help her do better. Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 131:21-132:7. He reviewed Plaintiff's
3 performance issues, including low ranked district results, store conditions, her leadership, the
4 need for her to take responsibility, and how her leadership had affected employees negatively.
5 Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 36:13-46:17, 116:1-120:8, 129:7-130:8, 135:8-137:17; Declaration of
6 Karl Schroeder ("Schroeder Decl.") at Ex. A. He then indicated a PIP would be used to focus on
7 sustained improvement. *Id.*

8 Over the next few weeks HR manager Ennis, Smith, and Plaintiff created the PIP together,
9 setting agreed goals for: "out of stocks"; driving top-line sales; overall customer satisfaction;
10 salary control; shrink control; food safety and sanitation; and expense controls. Reilly Decl.,
11 Ex. A at 218:12-18 (Plaintiff admits "*I wrote this plan, so yes. Ultimately it was my plan.*"); Ennis
12 Decl. at ¶11 and Ex. G. The PIP provided proven methods for achieving those goals and tools
13 Plaintiff could use to help reach those goals. Reilly Decl., Ex. H at 199:10-202:6. Plaintiff
14 thought the PIP supported what she was trying to do in the stores and would impact results
15 quickly. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 217:1-4, 217:8-23. The PIP would be reviewed every two weeks.
16 It was the expectation that while Plaintiff did not have to meet each goal, she needed to
17 demonstrate "*immediate and sustained*" improvement and that she was "making progress."
18 Reilly Decl., Ex. H at 202:22-215:13; Ex. G at 260:14-262:7; Ex. A 272:14-20.

19 On November 18, 2017, the day after the PIP had been developed, Plaintiff emailed Susan
20 Morris complaining about the PIP. Morris Decl. at ¶8 and Ex. A. The next business day Morris
21 responded to Plaintiff, encouraging her to make improvements and inviting Plaintiff to talk with
22 Morris about any other concerns she may have. *Id.* Plaintiff never called Morris in response.
23 Morris Decl. at ¶8.

24 **December 2017: Albertsons shuts down Plaintiff's dirty delis and issues Plaintiff**
25 **"Last Chance Warning"**. In mid-December 2017, Division President Schroeder made a pre-
26 scheduled tour of Plaintiff's Everett store 3298. When he arrived, Schroeder observed Plaintiff
27 adjusting canned product in an aisle. Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 171:3-173:16. It became quickly

1 apparent Plaintiff had not inspected the deli. During the store tour Schroeder found the deli
2 “*embarrassingly dirty*” with raw chicken sitting in an open sink, boxes of fried chicken resting on
3 the floor, and undated and outdated product for sale. *Id.* at 170:23–173:16. Even Plaintiff described
4 the deli as “*filthy*” with products for sale that violated many food safety regulations. Reilly Decl.,
5 Ex. A at 205:18–206:4. This situation disappointed Schroeder because these issues were “*already*
6 *[being addressed] in the PIP process.*” Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 172:3-14. Concerned with customer
7 safety, Schroeder took the very unusual step of closing down this deli during one of the busiest
8 times of the year. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 206:7-21; Ex. F at 172:15–173:16. Plaintiff agreed that the
9 deli had to be shut down. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 206:7-21. A second deli in Plaintiff’s district, at
10 store 497, was also shut down just two days later. Schroeder Decl. at ¶10.

11 With Plaintiff already on a PIP that required “immediate” improvement, the deli closures
12 could easily have justified termination of Plaintiff’s employment. Ennis Decl. at ¶12. Instead,
13 Schroeder decided in December 2017 to allow the PIP to continue to give Plaintiff time to
14 improve her performance. Schroeder Decl. at ¶11. But given the severity of the deli issues,
15 Schroeder issued a “Last & Final Warning” to Plaintiff due to food safety. *Id.* Shortly after the
16 deli closures Plaintiff took a leave of absence from December 19, 2017, to January 4, 2018, so
17 the “Last & Final Warning” was given to her upon her return on January 4. *Id.*; Reilly Decl., Ex.
18 A at 284:2-21, Ex. 16. Plaintiff understood when she received the Last & Final Warning that
19 food safety and sanitation were critical components of her PIP, and that the warning was directly
20 related to the December deli closures. *Id.* Schroeder also extended the length of the PIP by the
21 length of the leave of absence, to ensure that Plaintiff would not be penalized for taking the leave.

22 **January 2018: Following a complaint of discrimination by Plaintiff, Albertsons**
23 **retains independent investigator who finds no discrimination and that PIP was justified.**

24 Just before Plaintiff returned from her leave of absence, she emailed Albertsons President Bob
25 Miller, Susan Morris, and Peggy Jones complaining of gender, minority, age and disability
26 discrimination, and that her PIP and financial metrics were unfair. Morris Decl. at ¶9 and Ex. A.
27 Albertsons retained an independent, outside investigator, attorney Rebecca Dean, to perform an

1 investigation of the complaint. Ennis Decl. at ¶15. Dean interviewed Johnson and twelve (12)
2 other witnesses and concluded on February 19, 2018: “[T]here is ample evidence of legitimate
3 business reasons for implementing a performance improvement plan and no evidence that her
4 gender has played a role.” Ennis Decl. at Ex. I. Following this finding, Albertsons also redoubled
5 its efforts and retrained Seattle Division management on Albertsons policies against gender
6 discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, as well as a half-day training on unconscious bias.
7 Ennis Decl. at ¶16; Schroeder Decl. at ¶12.

8 **January-April 2018: Plaintiff fails to consistently improve pursuant to the PIP and**
9 **her employment is terminated.** Plaintiff, Ennis, and Smith continued with their PIP follow up
10 meetings. On March 8, 2018 they held the “eight-week” follow-up PIP meeting. Reilly Decl.,
11 Ex. A at 271:6-11, Ex. 13. Plaintiff agreed that she was not meeting her PIP goals. “Out of
12 stocks,” shrink, and food safety were her three biggest areas of opportunity, but showed little or
13 no improvement, with Plaintiff admitting: those areas “*did not show the improvement in which*
14 *we were looking for.*” *Id.* at 272:14-25.

15 On March 28, 2018, Plaintiff attended her “ten-week,” and final, follow-up PIP meeting.
16 Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 274:21–275:4. The 12-week PIP process had actually been ongoing since
17 November 21, 2017, so this “ten-week” follow-up was well beyond the 12-week period originally
18 envisioned for her PIP. *See* Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Exs. 10 and 14. The results did not show
19 immediate and sustained improvement. **First**, objective statistics (provided by Plaintiff) confirmed
20 Plaintiff had not made immediate and sustained improvement on numerous key performance
21 indicators. For example, the PIP set as a goal by January 12, 2018, that Plaintiff’s “out of stocks”
22 should be at “200 or less.” Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex. 10. As of March 28, 2018, however, Plaintiff
23 actually reported at the PIP meeting that her out of stocks were at 568—way over the goal, with no
24 continuous improvement. The statistics were actually trending worse. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex.
25 14. A summary of Plaintiff’s performance during the PIP also failed to show continuous
26 improvement and, in fact, Plaintiff’s performance became worse in some areas. Backus Decl. at
27 ¶¶21, 23.

1 **Second**, Plaintiff's district had not shown progress in shrink compared to the fourth
2 quarter ("shrink" is the difference between what the Company purchases and what it sells—it
3 can be caused by a variety of factors such as expired product, poor ordering, poor merchandising,
4 theft, and other causes (Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 39:9–40:1) and her district still ranked in the bottom
5 quartile. Backus Decl. at ¶23. **Third**, a March 2018 visit to the Everett deli (previously closed in
6 December 2017 due to food safety violations) was again found to be "*filthy*" with outdated
7 product for sale. *Id.*; Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex. 14. Plaintiff did not contest these findings, but
8 thought her overall performance was generally improving. *Id.*

9 Schroeder, Backus, Smith, and Ennis reviewed the performance during the PIP and did
10 not find immediate and sustained improvement. Schroeder then consulted again with Susan
11 Morris on the decision to terminate, reviewing Plaintiff's performance under the PIP. Reilly
12 Decl., Ex. B at 306:15–314:4; Ex. H at 251:10-21. Morris agreed with the decision to terminate
13 Plaintiff. Demotion was not considered an option because Plaintiff, unlike others who had been
14 demoted after only a short time as District Manager, did not succeed despite a PIP designed to
15 improve her management in a position she had held for many years. Reilly Decl., Ex. H at 265:13
16 – 266:7. Also, the key performance indicators with which Plaintiff struggled, such as shrink and
17 out of stocks were also standards Store Directors must meet. Backus Decl. at ¶23. On April 7,
18 2018, Backus informed Plaintiff that her employment was being terminated "*due to your overall*
19 *job performance, which does not meet expectations, and your failure to successfully complete the*
20 *performance improvement plan.*" Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 303:1-24, Ex. 19; Ex. B at 314:19–315:2.

21 **Albertsons replaces open District Manager position with a woman; district**
22 **performance improves under new management.** As a result of Plaintiff's separation, Backus
23 promoted an African-American female, Eureka McCrae, to District Manager. With this
24 management shuffle, stores were again realigned amongst the districts, just like when Plaintiff
25 first became a District Manager in the Seattle Division. Reilly Decl., Ex. H at 268:2–269:12; Ex.
26 A at 114:8–115:12. Some District 23 stores were moved into District 24, the district previously
27 managed by Plaintiff, and some stores closed so the property could be sold. Reilly Decl., Ex. B

1 at 96:1–98:20, 104:8–107:17. McCrae actually assumed management over some stores
2 previously managed by Plaintiff. *Id.* Since assuming the management of those stores, profits have
3 increased and out of stock items and shrink have decreased markedly. Backus Decl. at ¶25.
4 Overall District 24 same store performance and comparative district ranking has also markedly
5 improved under new management. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 179:14-23; Backus Decl. at ¶25.
6 Following the promotion of McCrae, the Company filled the next Seattle Division District
7 Manager position with a woman, as well. Backus Decl. at ¶26.

8 **Procedural posture.** On or about October 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in King
9 County Superior Court. Albertsons timely removed the case on November 20, 2018. Trial is now
10 set for February 24, 2020. This motion follows.

11 **IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

12 **A. Summary Judgment Standard of Proof.**

13 Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
14 to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
15 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 mandates the
16 entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
17 the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
18 burden of proof at trial. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). To establish a
19 material fact, a party must present information based on personal knowledge and set forth
20 specific, admissible facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), (4). “Conclusory allegations unsupported by
21 factual data cannot defeat summary judgment.” *Rivera v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 331 F.3d
22 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). Further, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
23 the plaintiff’s position [is] insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
24 reasonably find for the plaintiff.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986).

25 **B. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a *Prima Facie* Gender Discrimination Claim.**

26 The framework used to analyze Title VII gender discrimination claims applies equally to
27 the state claim under the WLAD. The showings required for a gender-based disparate treatment

1 claim under both Title VII and the WLAD are identical, except for the causation element. Under
2 Title VII, Plaintiff must establish the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action, while
3 under the WLAD she must demonstrate that the protected activity was a “substantial factor” in
4 the employer’s decision to take the adverse employment action. *Scrivener v. Clark College*, 181
5 Wn.2d 439, 444, 334 P.3d 541 (2014), citing *Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc.*, 127
6 Wn.2d 302, 310, 898 P.2d 284 (1995) (the “substantial factor” test is the appropriate standard for
7 determining whether an employer's adverse employment decision was “because of” one of the
8 prohibited factors enumerated in RCW 49.60.180(2)).

9 Plaintiff concedes that she has no direct evidence of discriminatory animus. Reilly Decl.,
10 Ex. A at 152:22–155:7. In the absence of direct evidence, the *McDonnell Douglas* burden shifting
11 framework is used. *Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc.*, 292 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir.
12 2002) (citing *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Under this framework,
13 Plaintiff must first establish her *prima facie* case: (1) that she is a member of a protected class;
14 (2) that she performed her job satisfactorily; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action;
15 and (4) that her employer treated her differently than a similarly-situated employee outside of her
16 protected class. *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
17 Once the *prima facie* case is established, the employer must show a legitimate reason for the
18 treatment. *McDonnell Douglas*, 411 U.S. at 802–04. Finally, the plaintiff must show pretext, and
19 in Washington, the plaintiff “may satisfy the pretext prong of the *McDonnell Douglas* framework
20 by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that the
21 employer’s articulated reason for its action is pretextual or (2) that although the employer’s stated
22 reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer.”
23 *Scrivener*, 181 Wn.2d at 441–42. Plaintiff’s claim should be rejected for several independent
24 reasons.

25 Plaintiff’s Title VII and RCW 49.60 gender discrimination claim asserts that “[a]
26 substantial factor and/or motivating factor in the decision to terminate Ms. Johnson’s
27

1 employment was ... gender discrimination ...” Dkt. #1-1 at ¶4.36. Plaintiff cannot meet her
2 burden and her claim should be dismissed.

3 **1. Plaintiff was not performing satisfactorily.**

4 Overwhelming evidence proves that Plaintiff had a long history of not performing
5 satisfactory work and thus she cannot establish the second element of her *prima facie* case.

6 **First**, over the years different Albertsons managers, including Dennis Bassler, Susan
7 Morris, and Joe Perry observed Plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance. **Second**, following the 2015
8 Albertsons-Safeway merger, District Manager performance expectations for all District Managers
9 increased, and specific metrics were applied. Plaintiff admitted her district was not “*meeting the*
10 *metrics*” and her performance review “*established*” that fact. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 178:19-23.
11 Plaintiff outright acknowledged that 2016 was “*the worst year of [her] career.*” Reilly Decl., Ex. A
12 at 177:23–179:4, Ex. 8. Plaintiff even vowed not to let her supervisors, Schroeder or Backus, down
13 in 2017 and that she would “*never let that [poor of performance] happen ... again.*” *Id.* at 178:24–
14 179:4.

15 **Third**, Plaintiff’s did not perform well again in 2017, and she knew it. Plaintiff’s district
16 ranked last in nine of the 18 metrics, and ranked in the bottom three of all 18 main metrics
17 measured. Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 44:13–45:18. The Division President observed that the stores in
18 Plaintiff’s district were found to be “*dirty, filthy*” and were “*some of the worst-operated stores [he*
19 *had] seen in 42 years*” and that Plaintiff’s district was the “*worst district*” he had ever seen by far.
20 *Id.* at 36:13-19, 43:21–44:12. Plaintiff’s district also was not following corporate-directed sales
21 programs. Store Directors complained about Plaintiff’s management, offering to resign positions,
22 and a “turnover report” confirmed employees were leaving her district at twice the rate of other
23 districts. *Id.* at 49:1-22.

24 During 2017 and 2018, Plaintiff actually provided statistics during the PIP process that
25 showed she was not making continuous improvement during the PIP. For example, Plaintiff
26 submitted numbers confirming she had failed to improve on “out of stocks,” meaning her store
27 shelves were missing merchandise, which hurt store sales. The PIP set “out of stock” goals at

1 “200 or less by January 12, 2018.” Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex. 10. During the PIP, Plaintiff’s
2 performance actually grew worse over time, and never came anywhere close to the goal. At the
3 two week PIP review Plaintiff disclosed her “out of stocks” were at 590 (Reilly Decl., Ex. A at
4 Ex. 11), at week six of the PIP review they were at 591 (Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex. 12), at week
5 eight they were at 458 (Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex. 13), and at week ten, the last PIP review,
6 Plaintiff reported that out of stocks were back *up* to 568 (Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex. 14).

7 Another key goal of the PIP was for Plaintiff’s district to achieve food safety and
8 sanitation compliance. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex. 10. But even Plaintiff admits that in December
9 2017, while on her PIP, Plaintiff’s two delis had to be shut down due to food safety violations.
10 This alone could have justified her termination. Ennis Decl. at ¶12. One of the delis was seen
11 again during the last PIP review in March 2018 and again was found to be “*filthy*” with outdated
12 product for sale. Backus Decl. at ¶23; Reilly Decl., Ex. A at Ex. 14.

13 Plaintiff’s district also had not shown significant progress in shrink compared to the fourth
14 quarter, with her district still ranked in the bottom quartile. These and other failures to achieve her
15 PIP goals demonstrate a documented and abundant record of performance issues. Under such
16 circumstances, Plaintiff cannot establish that she was performing her job satisfactorily:

17 The undisputed evidence, including [plaintiff’s] performance reviews and his
18 own self-ratings, shows that [his] performance was steadily declining ... [and]
19 an objective total self-report score of 2.6 out of 5, which [plaintiff] admitted
20 reflected performance that was unsatisfactory. [Plaintiff] does not dispute that
21 he missed deadlines and failed to complete action items [], nor does he dispute
22 that he was placed on a PIP to address his performance and warned that
23 termination was a possible outcome if his performance failed to improve. On
24 this record, [plaintiff] has not shown that his performance was satisfactory.
25 Therefore, he has not met the second element.

26 *Weil v. Citizens Telecom Services Company, LLC*, 922 F.3d 993, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2019)
27 (affirming summary judgment on discriminatory termination claims under Title VII and WLAD).
see also Pottenger v. Potlatch, 329 F.3d 730, 748-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff’s management was
lacking because his division was “losing money and the company lacked faith that [he] was the
one to turn [the division] around”).

1 **2. No evidence of more favorable treatment of similarly-situated male District**
2 **Managers.**

3 Plaintiff also fails to establish that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated
4 individuals outside of her protected class, the fourth element of her *prima facie* case. The Ninth
5 Circuit has previously held that employees are only similar if they have “similar jobs and display
6 similar conduct.” *Vasquez v. Cty. Of L.A.*, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has the
7 burden of establishing that she is “similarly situated” to her purported comparators in all material
8 respects. *Moran v. Selig*, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006).

9 Here, there is no evidence that any male District Manager is similarly situated. No other
10 male District Manager had the poor performance that Plaintiff had. No other District Manager
11 (male or female) (1) ranked consistently as low as Plaintiff overall in 18 key performance
12 indicators, (2) had complaints from subordinate Store Directors (wanting to resign) over lack of
13 leadership and support (like Plaintiff received); (3) was required to shut down two delis while on
14 a PIP; and (4) had double the employee turnover of other districts. *See, e.g., Vasquez*, (another
15 employee not considered similar to plaintiff because, even though they held the same level
16 position, the other employee “did not engage in problematic conduct of comparable
17 seriousness.”); *Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc.*, 615 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2010)
18 (employees in same position not similarly situated because, although they allegedly engaged in
19 similar harassing conduct, it did not prompt any complaints). District courts in the Ninth Circuit
20 also require some similarity in conduct or performance among comparators. *See, e.g., Walia v.*
21 *Potter*, No. C09-1188JLR, 2013 WL 392647, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2013); *Salas v. Indep. Elec.*
22 *Contrs. Inc.*, No. 11-1748 RAJ, 2013 WL 1898249, at *8 (W.D. Wash. 2013).

23 To the extent Plaintiff alleges that other men and women District Managers were
24 demoted, there is no evidence it was due to gender. The Dean investigation into Plaintiff’s
25 complaints also failed to validate any allegations of gender discrimination with respect to
26 Plaintiff’s employment and the employment of other females. Numerous courts have held that
27 similar “me too” evidence is not evidence of discrimination, and it not so here. *See, e.g., Day v.*

1 *Sears Holdings Corp.*, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2013); *Megivern v. Glacier Hills*
2 *Inc.*, No. 1110026, 2012 WL 529977, at *20 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2012).

3 **3. No causal connection between Plaintiff's gender and her termination.**

4 Plaintiff admits that no discriminatory acts against her occurred prior to March 1, 2017.
5 Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 156:4–157:4, Ex. 6. Thus, Plaintiff's Title VII and RCW 49.60 gender
6 discrimination claim are premised entirely on her termination. Dkt. #1-1 at ¶4.36. Plaintiff has
7 offered no direct or indirect evidence that her termination was because she was a woman. Quite the
8 contrary, the undisputed facts, including her own acknowledgement about her poor performance
9 and poor performance of the stores in her district, confirm Plaintiff's dismal performance record,
10 and her failed PIP, which easily justified her termination. Gender had nothing to do with it.

11 Although Plaintiff vaguely asserted in a letter to Susan Morris that Albertsons managers
12 treated "women, people of minority and age with harassment[.]" Morris Decl. at Ex. A. This
13 evidence and argument should be rejected as "evidence" of causation for several reasons. **First**,
14 Plaintiff has not asserted a hostile work environment/harassment claim and the evidence asserted
15 supports an unpled claim. **Second**, such allegations of purported treatment to others does not
16 establish causation in a disparate treatment claim, anyway. **Third**, Plaintiff testified that she
17 thought the supervising manager was "*an equal opportunity bully*" who treated both men and
18 women poorly. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 170:23 – 171:1. **Fourth**, there is no evidence that any
19 purported conduct at women was more abusive than with men. *See, e.g., Kahn v. Salerno*, 90
20 Wn. App. 110, 124, 951 P.2d 321 (1998) (insufficient evidence to determine whether Hoch was
21 more abusive toward female employees); *Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.*, 25 F.3d 1459 (9th
22 Cir.1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995). Finally, and most importantly, if the termination
23 was motivated by gender, why was Plaintiff's position filled by a female, and why did the Seattle
24 Division fill its next District Manager position by a woman. Backus Decl. at ¶¶24-26.

25 Plaintiff fails entirely to articulate a causal connection between her termination and her
26 gender. Her unsubstantiated allegations are not evidence and cannot support a claim of
27 discrimination. *See Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv.*, 518 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008).

1 **4. Albertsons had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's**
2 **termination, which was not a pretext.**

3 In the event the Court determines that Plaintiff has established her *prima facie* case, the
4 burden then shifts to Albertsons to articulate a legitimate, discriminatory, non-retaliatory reason
5 for its actions. *See Nilsson v. City of Mesa*, 503 F.3d 947, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2007). Once it does,
6 Plaintiff must then produce evidence that its reason was a pretext for retaliation. *Id.* “Only the
7 burden of production shifts [to defendant]; the plaintiff still carries the burden of persuasion.”
8 *Lindsey v. Clatskanie People’s Utility District*, 140 F. Supp.3d 1077, 1089 (D. Or. October 23,
9 2015) (citing *Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine*, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).

10 Albertsons easily meets its burden in establishing a legitimate reason for Plaintiff’s
11 termination. Plaintiff admitted that her performance in 2016 was not satisfactory. On March 31,
12 2017, Plaintiff emailed Backus and admitted the poor performance on the district “graphs on the
13 wall” reminded her of 2016—and that her district was reputed to be “*the worst.*” Reilly Decl., Ex.
14 A at 176:16-20 and Ex. 8. Plaintiff again knew that she had to “*fix this.*” *Id.* In September 2017,
15 Ennis and Smith met with Plaintiff to help her address the leadership issues and concerns that had
16 been expressed about her management style. Reilly Decl., Ex. G. at 249:14–251:10; Ex. H at
17 47:13–48:24. Albertsons then devoted substantial effort through the PIP to attempt to help Plaintiff
18 improve. During Plaintiff’s PIP, however, Albertsons was forced to shut down two of Plaintiff’s
19 delis. This alone could have justified her termination. Albertsons nevertheless continued with the
20 PIP review process and Plaintiff herself presented facts that substantiated that she had not had
21 steady improvement under the PIP. Albertsons “*has articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory*
22 *reason for its actions: Plaintiff’s performance, as documented by several different supervisors, was*
23 *below the defined quality and quantity metrics and as a result, she was placed on a performance*
24 *improvement plan [then terminated].” Lassair v. Wilkie*, 2019 WL 5212959 at *5 (W.D. Wash.
25 2019).

26 Having set forth a legitimate business reason for its decision, Plaintiff must present
27 specific and substantial evidence that Albertsons’ reason for termination (1) has no basis in fact,

1 or (2) even if based in fact, the decision was not motivated by this reason, or (3) the reason is
2 insufficient to motivate an adverse employment decision. *Bergene v. Salt River Project*, 272 F.3d
3 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2001). In judging whether an employer's proffered justification is
4 "false," courts "only require that an employer honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if
5 its reason is 'foolish or trivial or even baseless.'" *Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.*, 281 F.3d
6 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]ourts only require that an employer honestly believed its reason
7 for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless") (citation and quotations
8 omitted); *Blair v. City of Mercer Island*, 2018 WL 2317610, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2018). The
9 compendium of evidence makes clear that Albertsons' reason – Plaintiff's poor district
10 performance, and failure to consistently improve during the PIP – was an honestly-held belief.

11 Faced with legitimate reasons for her termination, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext
12 because she does not have specific, substantial evidence that Albertsons' reasons are unworthy
13 of belief. *See Mondero v. Salt River Project*, 400 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court is
14 required only to make "reasonable" inferences in Plaintiff's favor, and it is unreasonable to
15 conclude that Plaintiff's well-documented and detailed performance deficiencies were made up
16 as a subterfuge for discrimination, particularly given that there is *no* evidence of any
17 discriminatory animus. Employers are entitled to make decisions based on employees'
18 "subjective" skills, even if employees disagree with them. *Pottenger*, 329 F.3d at 748-49 (9th
19 Cir. 2003) (the employer "has leeway to make subjective business decisions, even bad ones").
20 There is absolutely no evidence of discriminatory animus based on Plaintiff's gender.

21 **C. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a *Prima Facie* Retaliation Claim.**

22 Plaintiff's Title VII and RCW 49.60 retaliation claim asserts that "[a] substantial factor
23 and/or motivating factor in the decision to terminate Ms. Johnson's employment was ...
24 retaliation for having complained about gender discrimination." Dkt. #1-1 at ¶4.36. There is no
25 evidence supporting that allegation.

26 As with disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the WLAD, the framework used
27 to analyze Title VII retaliation claims applies equally to the state claims. *Graves v. Dep't of*

1 *Game*, 76 Wn. App. 705, 712, 887 P.2d 424 (1994). The showings required for a retaliation claim
2 under both Title VII and the WLAD are identical, except for the causation element. Under Title
3 VII, Plaintiff must establish the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action, while under
4 the WLAD she must demonstrate that the protected activity was a “substantial factor” in the
5 employer’s decision to take the adverse employment action. *Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.*
6 *Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013) (Title VII retaliation claims “require proof that the
7 [employer’s] desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action”);
8 *Allison v. Hous. Auth. of City of Seattle*, 118 Wn.2d 79, 95, 821 P.2d 34 (1991) (rejecting “but-
9 for” standard of causation in favor of more lenient “substantial factor” standard).

10 Under this framework, Plaintiff must first establish her *prima facie* case: (1) that she
11 engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there
12 is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. *Connor*
13 *v. Micron Technology, Inc.*, 341 F. App’x 302, 304 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has the burden of
14 affirmatively proving that her discrimination complaint “was at the heart of” Albertsons’ decision
15 to terminate her employment. *Williams v. City of Bellevue*, No. 2:16-CV-01034-RAJ, 2017 WL
16 4387590, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2017) (internal citation omitted).

17 Here, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim should be rejected for several reasons. **First**, to the
18 extent Plaintiff alleges retaliation because of her PIP or Last Chance Warning, those are not
19 adverse employment actions. *See, e.g., Cozzi v. Cty. of Marin*, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1061 (N.D.
20 Cal. 2011) (written warning did not constitute negative employment action because it did not
21 result in a significant change in employment status, and was based on admitted behavior); *Hoang*
22 *v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1104 (D. Or. 2010) (a warning letter which
23 affected no materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment
24 was not an adverse employment action under a claim of discrimination).

25 **Second**, there is no causation between Plaintiff’s complaint to Bob Miller, or any
26 complaint, and her eventual termination. Plaintiff’s performance problems pre-date Plaintiff’s
27 alleged protected activity. *See, e.g., Pearson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.*, 723 F.3d 36 (1st Cir.

1 2013) (No causal link between protected activity and termination where “problems with
2 employee pre-date any knowledge that the employee has engaged in protected activity ... it is
3 not permissible to draw the inference that subsequent adverse actions, taken after the employer
4 acquires such knowledge, are motivated by retaliation ... Were the rule otherwise, then a
5 disgruntled employee, no matter how poor his performance ... could effectively inhibit a well-
6 deserved discharge by merely filing ... a discrimination complaint.”). There is no evidence
7 Albertsons fabricated those deficiencies or that its reasons for Plaintiff’s termination are
8 unworthy of credence.

9 Moreover, it is undisputed that others complained about management, and were not
10 terminated. Plaintiff concedes that multiple District Managers and Store Directors (male and
11 female) complained to Albertsons about Backus and Smith. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 165:12 –
12 170:22, 197:13 – 198:20. Schroeder learned of those complaints, coming from men and women.
13 Reilly Decl., Ex. H at 72:20–73:13, 75:16–80:8, 103:21–113:24; 80:11–81:23. And, as a result,
14 Schroeder specifically coached Backus and Smith. Reilly Decl., Ex. H at 113:25–114:9; Ex. F at
15 111:20–112:12; Ex. B at 52:11-16; Schroeder Decl. at ¶12. Plaintiff may mistakenly assert
16 causation is established by the timing of the PIP, or her termination. But mere coincidence of
17 timing is insufficient to satisfy the causation of Plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. *See Govan v.*
18 *Security National Financial Corp.*, 502 F. App’x 671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 2012); *see also Coszalter*
19 *v. City of Salem*, 320 F.3d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (summary judgment may be appropriate if
20 the totality of facts fail to establish the requisite causal link).

21 **Third**, Albertsons had a legitimate non-retaliatory basis for the PIP and her eventual
22 termination. Plaintiff admittedly had the “*worst*” performance year of her career in 2016. In 2017
23 Plaintiff’s poor performance continued, necessitating the PIP. While working to improve
24 performance toward her PIP objectives, which in part was focused on food safety, Albertsons
25 was forced to close two of Plaintiff’s delis. Even Plaintiff admitted the delis were filthy and
26 selling out-of-date product. Albertsons’ termination of Plaintiff’s employment is well supported
27 by longstanding performance deficiencies, some of which even Plaintiff agrees existed.

1 **Fourth**, Plaintiff cannot show pretext. It is undisputed that Plaintiff engaged in the
2 conduct that necessitated the PIP. Albertsons had a good faith basis to institute the PIP, and the
3 eventual termination. Albertsons could have been justified in terminating Plaintiff's employment
4 after the delis had to be closed down in December 2017. However, Albertsons wanted to proceed
5 with the PIP with hopes of securing improvement. Plaintiff concedes that she has no direct
6 evidence of retaliatory animus. Reilly Decl., Ex. A at 155:10–155:24. Albertsons had a good
7 faith, non-retaliatory basis for its actions and Plaintiff cannot establish pretext. *See, e.g., Sieden*
8 *v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.*, 846 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2017) (summary judgment against former
9 manager's retaliation claim affirmed—discharge for poor performance not pretextual—although
10 plaintiff had received four promotions between 2001-2011, his most recent record showed
11 concerns about performance a year before alleged protected activity).

12 Even if Albertsons was wrong in determining that Plaintiff belonged on the PIP, it is
13 undisputed that Albertsons *reasonably believed* Plaintiff's performance was substandard, and the
14 PIP was warranted. The law is clear that making an incorrect personnel decision does not
15 establish a legally cognizable claim. *Domingo v. Boeing Employees' Credit Union*, 124 Wn. App.
16 71, 89, 98 P.3d 1222 (2004), *abrogated on other grounds by Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1*
17 *of Kittitas Cty.*, 189 Wn.2d 516, 528, 404 P.3d 464 (2017) (incorrect thinking on the decision-
18 maker's part does not prove the employer's explanation is pretext.); *see also Hill v. BCTI Income*
19 *Fund-I*, 144 Wn.2d 172, 190 n.14, 23 P.3d 440 (2001) *abrogated on other grounds by Mikkelsen*,
20 189 Wn.2d at 529 (recognizing that an employer may lawfully discharge an at-will employee
21 whom it reasonably perceives has misbehaved). Plaintiff's retaliation claim should be dismissed.

22 **D. Albertsons Is Not Liable for Punitive Damages as a Matter of Law.**

23 **First**, punitive damages are unavailable as a matter of law under state law. *Korslund v.*
24 *Dyncorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc.*, 121 Wn. App. 295, 334, 88 P.3d 966 (2004) (“Washington law
25 bars punitive damage awards unless they are authorized by statute”).

26 **Second**, Plaintiff cannot establish she is entitled to an award of punitive damages under
27 Title VII. Punitive damages are available only on a heightened showing of intentional

1 discrimination carried out with “malice or with reckless indifference to [plaintiff’s] federally
2 protected rights.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; *Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n*, 527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999).

3 Here, there is no evidence that Albertsons acted with “malice” or was “recklessly
4 indifferent.” Albertsons has comprehensive anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies and
5 trains all employees on these policies. Moreover, following the receipt of Plaintiff’s email to Bob
6 Miller in early January 2018, Albertsons retained an independent, outside investigator to
7 investigate Plaintiff’s allegations. The investigator concluded Albertsons had a legitimate
8 business reason for Plaintiff’s PIP, and also found no gender discrimination had occurred. Even
9 though the investigation findings confirmed no discrimination, and that the PIP was properly
10 given to Plaintiff, Albertsons required post-investigation that all Seattle Division senior
11 management undergo additional anti-discrimination training. Reilly Decl., Ex. F at 155:17-21.
12 Under *Kolstad*, Albertsons’ purported violation of Title VII did not even remotely approach the
13 degree of maliciousness or recklessness to support a claim for punitive damages.

14 V. CONCLUSION

15 “Federal courts do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s
16 business decisions.” *Torlowei v. Target*, 401 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2005); *see Garcia v. City of*
17 *Everett*, 14-30 RAJ, 2015 WL 1759208, at *7 (2015), *aff’d*, 728 Fed. Appx. 624 (9th Cir. 2018).
18 Nor do they “assess[] the merits—or even the rationality—of employers’ nondiscriminatory
19 business decisions.” *Mesnick v. General Electric Co.*, 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991). The
20 Court should decline Plaintiff’s invitation to do so in this case. Summary judgment in favor of
21 Albertsons is appropriate as a matter of law.

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1 DATED: November 26, 2019

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1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I hereby certify that on November 26, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
3 Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System, which in turn automatically generated a Notice of
4 Electronic Filing (NEF) to all parties in the case who are registered users of the CM/ECF system.
5 The NEF for the foregoing specifically identifies recipients of electronic notice. I hereby certify
6 that the following document was sent to the following CM/ECF participants:

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16 Executed on the 26th day of November, 2019, at Seattle, Washington.

17 *s/ Shanynn Foster*

18

Shanynn Foster, Legal Assistant